This paper develops an R&D decision-making model in the real options framework.
firm faces the risk of a competitor's technology development, which follows the Poisson arrival process. If a competitor completes an alternative technology first, a fraction of the technology value is lost.
By analytically deriving the model solutions as well as conducting numerical analysis with a wide range of parameter values, I reveal several new effects of the three types of uncertainty on R&D investment decisions. First, I show that higher uncertainty of research duration improves the project value and accelerates R&D investment. This implies that the uncertainty-investment sensitivity depends on the type of uncertainty. It is well known that the market uncertainty-investment sensitivity is negative because higher market uncertainty increases the incentive for a firm to wait for additional information.
On the other hand, technological uncertainty, which will not be dissolved by waiting, has positive effects on R&D investment because the R&D project value is convex with respect to research duration. A higher risk of a competitor's technology development intensifies the convexity. Because of the convexity, higher uncertainty of research duration increases the project value and speeds up R&D investment, especially combined with severe competition. 1
These results can potentially explain several empirical findings. For instance, Grullon, Lyandres, and Zhdanov (2012) and Kraft, Schwartz, and Weiss (2015) showed that the sensitivity of uncertainty to firm value increases for a firm with higher R&D intensity. Driver, Temple, and Urga (2006) showed that industries with high R&D intensity and severe preemptive competition tend to have positive uncertainty-investment sensitivities.
Second, I show that the effects of hidden competition on investment are not monotonic in an R&D project with research duration. It is well known that, in the absence of research duration, a greater threat of competitors accelerates investment because it decreases the value of waiting. With research duration, however, severe competition decreases the expected project value at project initiation because a competitor can potentially develop technology before project completion. When the latter effect dominates the former effect, severe competition delays R&D investment. Indeed, I show that the investment timing has U-shaped relation with the arrival rate of a competitor's technology development. I also show that the investment timing can be non-monotonic with respect to the remaining value after a competitor's technology development.
Lastly, I explain key differences from the related literature to date. A seminal work by Weeds (2002) is the most similar to this paper. She examined a real options model with uncertain research duration and rival preemption. However, in her model, a firm has complete information about its competitor while research duration is exponentially distributed. Unlike Weeds (2002) , I assume that not research duration, which can be estimated internally in the firm, but a competitor's technology development, which can be an unexpected and exogenous event, follows an exponential distribution. Recently, Cassimon, Backer, Engelen, Wouwe, and Yordanov (2011) and Pennings and Sereno (2011) conducted case studies of R&D projects in the pharmaceutical industry taking account of both technological and market uncertainty, but their models, which are based on European options, do not entail any implications of the optimal R&D investment timing. Their papers do not consider a risk of competition either. Thus, this paper, more so than the previous works, helps R&D decision-making with the three types of uncertainty.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. After Section 2 introduces the model setup, Section 3 derives the model solutions analytically. In Section 4, with numerical examples, I analyze the model in full detail and provide empirical implications.
Section 5 briefly summarizes the paper.
Model setup
Consider a firm that has an option to initiate an R&D project by paying sunk cost I 0 , such as investment costs in new facilities and equipment, which is a positive constant. 2 The project will take T years until completion, where T is a constant in Sections 3.1 and 3.2.
I will also consider random variable T in Section 3.3. Throughout the paper, T is called research duration. 3 For T years, the firm continuously pays cost I 1 , such as personnel expenses and experimental costs, which is a positive constant. I define total cost by
where a positive constant r is the discount rate. Total cost (1) increases in T . When T follows a random variable, total cost (1) is also stochastic. By introducing random T in Section 3.3, the model can capture technological uncertainty of research duration and costs.
At project completion, the firm receives one-shot profit X(t) as the market value of the technology, 4 where as in the standard real options literature (e.g., Dixit and Pindyck 2 This paper focuses on a fixed-size investment project for developing a new technology. It could be interesting for future research to incorporate the project type and/or size in the model. For instance, Nishihara and Ohyama (2008) , based on Weeds (2002) , investigated the choice between two alternative technologies, while Nishihara (2012) studied dynamic management of multiple investment projects with synergies. Several papers including Huisman and Kort (2015) , Shibata and Nishihara (2015a), and Lukas, Spengler, Kupfer, and Kieckhafer (2017) examined both investment timing and sizing decisions.
3 Some papers distinguish the lag between project inception and completion (the gestation lag) and the lag between project completion and commercial application (the application lag) (e.g., Pakes and Schankerman (1984) ). For simplicity, I assume that the total lag is equal to T . 4 X(t) may be interpreted as the expected discounted value of cash flows generated by the technology. I can easily extend the model solutions in the setup, allowing for a stream of cash flows after the completion time T rather than the one-shot profit. When cash flows follow a geometric Brownian motion, the solutions in the extended model are essentially the same as the solutions in this paper.
(1994)), X(t) follows a geometric Brownian motion:
where B(t) denotes the standard Brownian motion defined in the filtered probability space (Ω, F, {F t }, P) and µ, σ(> 0) and x(> 0) are constants. For convergence, I assume that r > µ. 5 By introducing X(t), the model can capture market uncertainty, which dynamically changes due to specific and macroeconomic shocks on the demand market.
As in the works by Armada, Kryzanowski, and Pereira (2011) In the last part of this section, I explain key differences from the related models in the previous literature. Weeds (2002) also focused on uncertainty of research duration and a competitor's development in the real options R&D model. The model adopts a game theoretic framework with full information and assumes that research duration follows an exponential distribution. In reality, however, a firm does not exactly know the R&D progress of its competitors (cf. incomplete information in Lambrecht and Perraudin (2003) and Nishihara and Fukushima (2008) ) and may not recognize which firm is a potential competitor for the project (cf. hidden competition in Armada, Kryzanowski, and Pereira (2011) and Lavrutich, Huisman, and Kort (2016) ). In addition, managers do not plan exponentially distributed research duration. Because an exponential distribution has the property of being memoryless, it is used for modelling an unexpected and exogenous event 5 For the economic rationale behind these assumptions, refer to standard textbooks such as Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and Guthrie (2009) . 6 An alternative approach for modeling competition is a game theoretic real option model (e.g., Huisman
(2001), Weeds (2002) , Pawlina and Kort (2006) , Nishihara and Shibata (2010) , Shibata (2016) ). However, this approach typically imposes stronger assumptions about information of competitors. As was discussed by Armada, Kryzanowski, and Pereira (2011) , a hidden competition model better fits R&D decision-making in the absence of information about competitors. 7 A competitor's technology development may reduce research duration T and costs I 1 and I 2 . This is because the firm can potentially develop a technology by utilizing the competitor's technology. I can easily derive the model solutions in the extended model, although I omit demonstrating the details.
such as a natural disaster. Accordingly, unlike Weeds (2002) , I assume that not research duration, which can be estimated internally in the firm, but a competitor's technology development, which can be an unexpected and exogenous event, follows an exponential distribution.
Cassimon, Backer, Engelen, Wouwe, and Yordanov (2011) and Pennings and Sereno (2011) have conducted case studies of pharmaceutical R&D projects. Their models include both market and technological uncertainty. However, their models, which are based on European compound options, cannot provide any implications about the optimal R&D investment timing. In addition, their models do not consider uncertainty of research duration and competition.
3 Model solutions
Project value and investment timing after a competitor's success
In Sections 3.1 and 3.2, I assume that T is a constant. I consider the problem backward.
Suppose that a competitor has already developed a technology in this subsection. The expected project value at the project initiation time τ is calculated as follows:
where
The subscript c denotes the value after a competitor's success. By (3), the project value function is expressed as
where the investment time τ is optimized over all stopping times.
As is well known (e.g., see Dixit and Pindyck (1994) ), in the continuation region, V c (x) satisfies the ordinary differential equation:
where µxd/dx + σ 2 x 2 /2d 2 /dx 2 corresponds to the generator of the geometric Brownian motion (2). A general solution to (6) is expressed as V c (x) = B 1 x β + B 2 x γ , where B 1 and B 2 are constants, and
By the trivial boundary condition, i.e., V c (0) = 0, I have B 2 = 0. For the investment threshold x * c , I have the boundary conditions:
which are called the value matching and smooth pasting conditions, respectively (e.g., see Dixit and Pindyck (1994) ). By solving (9) and (10), I can derive B 1 and x * c as follows.
Proposition 1 Suppose that a competitor has already developed a technology. The project value function V c (x) is given by
where the investment trigger x * c is defined by
The optimal investment time τ * c is given by
In Proposition 1, the upper equation in (11) stands for the value of the option to invest in the R&D project after a competitor develops a technology. Because the option value is higher than the investment value, the firm waits until the technology value X(t) hits the investment trigger x * c . Once X(t) hits x * c , the firm initiates the R&D project, and the expected project value becomes A c x * c . By ∂A c /∂α > 0, ∂A c /∂T < 0, ∂β/∂σ < 0, (11), and (12), I have
In other words, a higher remaining value after a competitor's success and shorter research duration increase the project value and accelerate R&D investment, whereas higher volatility increases the option value and delays investment.
Project value and investment timing before a competitor's success
In this subsection, I consider the problem before a competitor's success. Suppose that a competitor has not yet developed a technology at the project initiation time τ . Because the technology value falls to αX(τ + T ) for τ + T > T c , where T c denotes the time of a competitor's technology development, I can calculate the expected project value at τ as follows:
=AX(τ ),
where in (14) I used the independence between T c and X(t), and in (15) I have
using the distribution function of the exponential distribution.
By (15), the project value function is expressed as
where the investment time τ is optimized over all stopping times, and T c stands for the time of a competitor's technology development. Note that in (17), the project value changes to V c (X(T c )), which is defined by (11), at time T c , if T c ≤ τ holds.
As is well known, in the continuation region, V (x) satisfies the ordinary differential equation:
probability λdt in the infinitesimal time interval dt in the continuation region. Now, suppose that the investment threshold x * before a competitor's success is lower than the investment threshold x * c after a competitor's success. This will be verified in Appendix A. Because of x * < x * c , a general solution to (18) is expressed as V (x) = V c (x) +B 1 xβ +B 2 xγ, whereB 1 andB 2 are constants, andβ andγ are defined bỹ
Note that V c (x) satisfies (6) for x < x * (< x * c ). As in Section 3.1, by the trivial boundary condition, i.e., V (0) = 0, I haveB 2 = 0. For the investment trigger x * , the value matching and smooth pasting conditions become
respectively. By solving (21) and (22), I can deriveB 1 and x * as follows.
Proposition 2 Suppose that a competitor has not developed a technology. The project value function V (x) is given by
where V c (x) is the upper equation in (11), and the investment trigger x * ∈ (0, x * c ) is defined by the solution to
The optimal investment time τ * is given by
In the upper equation in (23), the project value V (x) is decomposed into the project value after a competitor's success, i.e., V c (x), and the value of the option of investing in the project before a competitor's success, i.e., (x/x * )β(Ax * − I − V c (x * )). Proposition 2 implies the R&D investment policy as follows. The firm waits for R&D investment until the technology value X(t) hits the investment trigger x * . If a competitor develops a technology first, the firm increases the investment trigger from x * to x * c . When X(t) hits x * before a competitor's technology development, the firm initiates the R&D project, and the expected project value becomes Ax * , where A includes a discount due to a risk of a competitor's success during research duration T . 
Extended model
Although so far I have treated research duration T as a constant, it is easy to extend the results in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 to a case with random variable T . In this subsection, I
assume that T follows a nonnegative random variable. For tractability, I assume that T is independent of technology value X(t) and a competitor's technology development time T c . This assumption means that risks of technology, market value, and competition are not directly related to each other.
By taking expectations of (1), (4), and (16), I definē
By replacing I, A c , and A withĪ,Ā c , andĀ, respectively, and tracing the discussions in Sections 3.1 and 3.2, I can easily derive the model solutions. Indeed, the project value function and investment trigger after a competitor's success are equal to (11) and (12) The model can capture uncertainty of technology, market value, and competitors in the R&D decision-making process, while previous models miss any of the three features.
Nevertheless, I can analytically derive the R&D project value and investment timing, which help in a real-world decision-making process of R&D investment. It is one of the contributions of this paper to develop such a general and tractable model and derive the analytical solutions. In the next section, I will make another contribution to the literature by analyzing the model and revealing the interactions of the three risks in numerical examples.
Numerical analysis and implications

Baseline analysis
This paper does not focus on a case study of a specific R&D project. Instead, I show numerical results for a wide range of parameter values, demonstrating several properties of the project value and the investment policy in the model. I set the base parameter values in Table 1 . There are several methods for estimating the market parameter values, i.e., r, µ, and σ, in a real options model (e.g., using the capital asset pricing model).
For instance, Chapter 3 of Guthrie (2009) (2006)). However, taking account of the fact that the average research duration is around 2 to 4 years in most of the literature (e.g., Pakes and Schankerman (1984) ), I assume that T takes a value in [2, 4] following a uniform distribution. The parameter values λ = 0.2 and α = 0.5 mean that a competitor is expected to develop a technology 1/λ = 5 years later and that the technology value decreases by half if a competitor develops prior to the firm. Table 2 presents the investment triggers and project values, while Figure 1 shows the value functions V (X(t)) and V c (X(t)). In the baseline case, the firm initiates the R&D project when the technology value X(t) hits the investment trigger x * = 11.593 before a competitor's technology development. The R&D project takes random duration If a competitor develops a technology before X(t) hits x * = 11.593, the firm changes the R&D investment policy to the following. The firm invests in the R&D project once X(t) hits x * c = 40.658(> x * = 11.593). There is no longer risk of competition. The NPV at the investment time becomesĀ c x * c −Ī = 15.49 = 4.236Ī, which means that, considering the option value of waiting, the firm waits until the expected profit exceeds 4.236 times higher than the expected investment cost. Note that 4.2360 is much higher than the corresponding value 1.3188 before a competitor's success. This is because due to λ = 0.2, β = 2.873 is much higher than β = 1.236 (cf. (7) and (19)). It can be interpreted that a risk of competition greatly decreases the value of waiting. At completion time τ * c + T , the firm receives the discounted technology value 0.5X(τ * c + T ). In the following subsections, I will examine the comparative statics with respect to uncertainty of market value, research duration, and a competitor's technology development. I reveal how the interactions of the three risks affect the R&D project value and investment policy.
The impacts of market value uncertainty
This subsection presents the comparative statics with respect to market value volatility σ. Figure 2 depicts investment triggers x * and x * c as well as project values V (x) and V c (x) for varying levels of σ. 8 The other parameter values are set in Table 1. I can see from Figure 2 that higher σ increases x * , x * c , V (x), and V c (x). The reason is that β andβ decrease from 1.3007 and 3.7870 to 1.1327 and 2, respectively, for σ = 0.1 to 0.4, which means that the value of waiting increases for a higher σ. These results are straightforward and consistent with the standard theory that higher market uncertainty increases the option value of waiting and delays the exercise of the option (e.g., Dixit and Pindyck (1994) ). For a wide range of parameter values, I also investigated the impacts of h, λ, and α on the volatility effects. However, I could not find any significant interactions between uncertainty of market value and uncertainty of research duration or competition. Dixit and Pindyck (1994) , presents the comparative statics under this assumption, although a few papers, including Wong (2007) , examine the comparative statics assuming a relation between µ and σ.
The impacts of uncertainty of research duration
Although uncertainty of research duration and costs is recognized as a key characteristic of an R&D project (e.g., Raz, Shenhar, and Dvir (2002) ), few studies have revealed its impacts on R&D investment timing and project value. 9 In this paper, I demonstrate that higher uncertainty of research duration increases project value and accelerates investment and that severe competition intensifies the positive effects. These results contrast with the impacts of market uncertainty (cf. Section 4.2). Technological uncertainty, unlike market uncertainty, will never be dissolved by waiting, and hence, the firm has no incentive to delay investment and obtain extra information. This difference leads to the opposite effects of uncertainty.
Although my results about the positive effects of technological uncertainty are novel, many empirical observations support the results. For example, Driver, Temple, and Urga (2006) showed positive sensitivities of uncertainty to investment in industries with high R&D intensity. They also documented that positive sensitivities are observed in industries with strong first-mover advantages, i.e., high risks of competition. My results are also consistent with empirical findings by Grullon, Lyandres, and Zhdanov (2012) and Kraft, Schwartz, and Weiss (2015) . Indeed, they showed that the sensitivities of uncertainty to firm values are higher for firms with higher R&D intensity.
The impacts of competitor risk
This subsection presents the comparative statics with respect to the arrival rate λ of a competitor's technology development and the remaining value α after a competitor's success. However, the tradeoff changes with parameter values. For instance, Figure 7 shows the results for λ = 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, and 0.8. For λ = 0.4 and 0.6, x * is U-shaped in α, whereas for λ = 0.8, x * decreases in α. This is because the former effect, which is stronger for higher λ, can dominate the latter effect.
In summary, I find that R&D investment timing can be U-shaped in the strength of competition. This result is strongly contrasted with previous findings in the literature.
Indeed, the standard literature has argued that a higher risk of competition decreases the value of waiting and accelerates investment. Because they do not consider any interactions between competition and research duration, the monotonic results hold. Although 
Conclusion
In this paper, I developed a generic R&D decision-making model involving three types of uncertainty in an R&D project, namely, uncertainty of research duration, market value of technology, and technology development by a competitor. By deriving the analytical solutions in the model, this paper helps practitioners and researchers to evaluate and optimize various cases of R&D investment. In addition, by analyzing the model solutions for a wide range of parameter values, I obtained novel implications about the effects of the three risks on R&D decision making.
I showed that higher uncertainty of research duration increases the project value and speeds up R&D investment through the convexity of the project value with respect to research duration. I also showed that severe competition increases the convexity and then intensifies the positive effects of uncertainty of research duration on R&D investment.
These results are novel and contrasted with the effects of market uncertainty, and they can account for several empirical findings about positive effects of uncertainty in industries with high R&D intensities and severe competition. Furthermore, I showed that R&D investment timing has a U-shaped relation with the strength of competition. Compared to the monotonic results in the previous literature, I showed that the non-monotonic results can occur through the interactions between competition and research duration.
A limitation of the model is the assumption that the three risks are independent.
Without this assumption, the model does not allow analytical solutions. In practice, however, competitor risk may increase as the market value of technology increases. In such a case, one may find that the effects of market uncertainty, combined with a risk of competition, change from the normal effects. Further, the model does not consider how to finance the R&D project. In recent years, many papers, including Nishihara and Shibata (2013) , Shibata and Nishihara (2015b) , and Sundaresan, Wang, and Yang (2015) , have investigated the effects of financial frictions on investment. R&D investment timing and project value could depend on how effectively a firm finances its project. These issues could be interesting topics for future research. Table 1 . Table 1 .
